North Korea's Supply Chain Is Your Problem Now

North Korea-linked hackers have been quietly contaminating the tools developers use every day, according to The Hacker News.

The campaign, called PolinRider, is tied to a group known as Contagious Interview. These attackers impersonate recruiters on LinkedIn and GitHub, building fake companies with AI-generated employee profiles to appear legitimate. Developers who take the bait are tricked into running malicious code during fake job assessments.

What makes this campaign different is scale. As of April 2026, attackers had compromised 1,951 public GitHub repositories across 1,047 separate owners. They have also published 108 malicious packages across npm, Go, Composer, and one Google Chrome extension.

Here is how the infection spreads. A developer installs an infected package or opens a compromised repository in VS Code or Cursor (popular code editing tools). A hidden task file runs automatically when the folder opens. The malware then searches the developer's machine for common configuration files and injects more malicious code into them. It rewrites Git history to make those changes look like they came from the original author, so nothing appears suspicious at a glance.

The final payload delivers DEV#POPPER RAT (a remote access trojan, a tool that gives attackers control over an infected machine) and OmniStealer, which targets credentials for cloud platforms, crypto wallets, and developer tools.

If you are a developer, treat unsolicited job outreach with real scepticism. Audit any VS Code task files in your projects. Check repository activity logs, not just the visible commit history.

Mozilla's security research team has demonstrated that AI-powered coding agents can be turned against developers through indirect prompt injection (a technique where hidden instructions embedded in content manipulate an AI into taking actions the user never intended).

The proof-of-concept targets tools like Claude Code. An attacker creates a malicious GitHub repository. The developer asks their AI coding assistant to review it. The hidden instructions inside the repository instruct the AI to take harmful actions quietly, without the developer ever knowing.

No malicious file needs to run. The AI does the work for the attacker.

This is a new attack surface that grows as AI becomes embedded in everyday development workflows. For now, treat AI-assisted code review of unfamiliar repositories the same way you would treat running unknown executable files: with caution.

What SimpleHelp is: SimpleHelp is a remote support and monitoring tool used by IT teams and managed service providers to access and manage computers remotely.

What it is: CVE-2026-48558 is an authentication bypass (a flaw that lets attackers skip the login process entirely) in SimpleHelp RMM. Attackers are actively exploiting it to install Djinn Stealer on victim machines.

Who's at risk: Any organisation running an unpatched SimpleHelp RMM server that is reachable from the internet.

CVSS: Not yet scored — treat as High until confirmed.

Root cause: The flaw exists in SimpleHelp's authentication layer, which fails to properly verify that a request comes from a legitimate, credentialed user before granting access. An attacker can craft a request that bypasses this check entirely. Think of it like a staff entrance that checks for a badge but accepts a blank card.

Attack vector: An attacker sends a specially crafted request to an exposed SimpleHelp server. The server skips credential validation and grants access. The attacker then deploys Djinn Stealer, which harvests credentials for cloud platforms, source control systems, package registries, and AI development tools across Windows, macOS, and Linux.

Detection strategies:

• Unexpected new processes or files appearing on machines managed via SimpleHelp
• Outbound connections to unfamiliar hosts from the SimpleHelp server process
• Credential alerts from cloud platforms shortly after SimpleHelp activity

Recommended actions:

1. Apply the vendor patch immediately — check the official SimpleHelp advisory
2. Restrict SimpleHelp server access to trusted IP ranges only
3. Audit logs for unauthorised access attempts against your SimpleHelp instance

The PolinRider campaign described above spreads through a VS Code feature called task files. These are configuration files that can run code automatically when you open a project folder. Most developers never review them, which makes them a perfect hiding spot.

Here is what to do right now. In any project you have cloned or installed recently, open the .vscode folder and look for a file called tasks.json. Check whether any task includes "runOn": "folderOpen". If it does and you did not put it there, treat it as suspicious.

You can also disable automatic task running entirely. In VS Code, go to Settings and search for "task auto detect" to review what runs without your explicit permission.

This takes five minutes and requires no extra software.

A case study by Ransom-ISAC points to a US county government that quietly paid roughly $1 million in bitcoin to prevent stolen files from being published, according to The Hacker News. No systems were locked. No encryption was involved. The attackers stole data and charged for silence. The payment was never publicly disclosed. This case reinforces why public sector bodies need data exfiltration (unauthorised theft of data) response plans that are distinct from ransomware playbooks, and why paying does not guarantee files are deleted.