Check Point's Admin Door Was Wide Open

Check Point, which makes firewall and network security software used by enterprises worldwide, has patched a critical authentication bypass flaw that attackers were already exploiting, according to The Hacker News.

The vulnerability, CVE-2026-16232 (CVSS 9.3, Critical), lives inside the login process of SmartConsole, the management interface administrators use to control Check Point security systems. An attacker needed no username or password. Instead, they could reach across the internet, grab a valid login token, and walk straight in with full administrative rights.

Once inside, they could rewrite security policies, change firewall rules, and reconfigure defences entirely. Think of it as someone not just picking your lock, but then being handed the keys to every room in the building.

The catch: exploitation only works when the Management Server is exposed directly to the internet without IP restrictions in place. Check Point says a small number of customers were targeted and have been notified.

Patches are now available via the July 22 Jumbo hotfix. Two related flaws were patched at the same time: CVE-2026-62144 (CVSS 9.3), which also allows unauthenticated attackers to run administrative commands remotely, and CVE-2026-62145 (CVSS 7.5), which lets a low-privilege user escalate to root-level control.

What to do: If your organisation runs Check Point Security Management, apply the July 22 Jumbo hotfix immediately. Restrict Management Server access to trusted IP addresses only, and place it behind a firewall rather than exposing it directly to the internet.

Researchers at Socket Security uncovered a self-propagating worm called Sandworm_Mode, according to Dark Reading. It spreads through malicious npm packages (small software bundles developers download to build applications) and then burrows into the AI coding assistants and automated build pipelines developers rely on daily.

CrowdStrike later analysed 14 of the worm's known behaviours. Only two produced signals reliable enough to trigger an alert. The rest looked identical to normal developer activity.

The worm steals credentials for npm, GitHub, cloud platforms, and AI providers, then quietly sends them to attackers. It also waits 48 to 96 hours after installation before activating, deliberately breaking the link between infection and suspicious behaviour that most detection tools rely on.

The core problem is blunt: security tools cannot flag anomalies in AI toolchain behaviour when nobody has yet established what normal looks like.

What to do: If your team uses AI coding assistants or automated build pipelines, audit which npm packages have been installed in the last 90 days. Rotate cloud and AI provider credentials now if you cannot confirm their integrity.

What Windmill is: Windmill is an open-source developer platform that lets teams build and run automated scripts, workflows, and internal tools through a web interface.

What it is: An unauthenticated path traversal flaw (where an attacker navigates outside the intended file directory by inserting ../ sequences into a file request) in Windmill's log file retrieval endpoint. No login is required to trigger it.

Who's at risk: Anyone running a Windmill instance below version 1.603.3 that is exposed to the internet. VulnCheck identified approximately 170 vulnerable systems across 24 countries. Risk is highest where the SUPERADMIN_SECRET environment variable is configured, as reading it grants full superadmin access and arbitrary code execution.

CVSS: 7.5 (High) — patch this week.

Root cause: The filename parameter passed to the get_log_file endpoint was concatenated directly into a file path with no sanitisation checks. The server trusted whatever string the user supplied and opened the corresponding file. Version 1.603.3 adds input sanitisation to block traversal sequences.

Attack vector: An attacker sends a crafted unauthenticated request to /api/w/{workspace}/jobs_u/get_log_file/{filename}, substituting the filename for a traversal string such as ../../../proc/1/environ. The server returns the contents of that file. If SUPERADMIN_SECRET is present in that environment file, the attacker uses it as a Bearer token to authenticate as superadmin and execute arbitrary code. Active exploitation has targeted /etc/passwd for credential reconnaissance.

Detection strategies:

1. Look for HTTP requests to /api/w/*/jobs_u/get_log_file/ containing ../ or %2e%2e sequences in server access logs.
2. Monitor for unexpected reads of /etc/passwd or /proc/1/environ in file access logs.
3. Alert on any Bearer token authentication from IP addresses that have not previously logged in.

Recommended actions:

1. Upgrade Windmill to version 1.603.3 or later immediately.
2. Restrict public internet access to the Windmill management interface.
3. Rotate the SUPERADMIN_SECRET value and audit recent superadmin session activity.

PyPI (the Python Package Index) is the central repository where developers download Python software libraries. As of this month, it now rejects any new files uploaded to a release older than 14 days.

This matters for non-developers too. If an attacker compromises a developer's credentials, one classic move is to slip malicious code into an older, trusted package version. Users downloading what they believe is a stable, long-tested release would get the poisoned version instead.

The new rule shuts that window. Older releases are now frozen. Attackers cannot retroactively tamper with them even if they steal the right credentials.

You do not need to do anything to benefit from this change. It is already live for all packages on PyPI.

What to do: If your organisation's software teams use Python packages, ask them to confirm they are pulling dependencies from PyPI directly rather than caching old versions locally from before July 2026.

CISA has added CVE-2026-0770, a critical remote code execution flaw in Langflow (an open-source tool for building AI agent workflows), to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogue, according to Bleeping Computer. Federal agencies must patch by July 24, 2026. The flaw allows unauthenticated attackers to run commands as root. Over 220 exploitation attempts from 64 unique IP addresses were recorded before the CISA directive was issued. Private organisations running Langflow should treat this as equally urgent.